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Abstract—We present the first technique of passive finger-
printing for Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)
networks without Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and experience
on real environment. Unlike existing work, our method does not
rely on the functions of a specific product or DPI of the SCADA
protocol. Our inference method, which is based on the intrinsic
characteristics of SCADA, first identifies the network port used
for the SCADA protocol, then consecutively infers the field devices
and master server. We evaluated the effectiveness of our method
using two network traces collected from a real environment for
a month and a half, three days from different CI respectively.
This confirmed the ability of our method to capture most of the
SCADA with high F-score nearly 1, except for HMIs connected
to master server, and demonstrated the practical applicability of
the method.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivation. Disaster caused to critical infrastructure (CI)
by cybercriminals have been discovered since the damage
resulting from Stuxnet and subsequent attacks [1]. Here it is
noteworthy that cybercriminals’ objectives for CI seem differ-
ent from their intentions with ordinary IT network malware. In
the case of CI, the attack is designed specifically for a certain
operation and the attackers do not reuse the method after their
attack is discovered. For this reason, not only inspection for
real cite by security expert, we also need to introduce a security
device well suited to CI such as anomaly-based IDS designed
for Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) [2],
instead of fully depending on the introduction of a signature-
based antivirus program.
Unfortunately, in reality, a commonly occurring desperate
situation is that the CI administrator does not have information
about all the assets forming part of the CI or provides wrong
information. This happens because the information is not
updated, or because the maintenance is delegated to another
IT company or the owner of the infrastructure is misinformed
after maintenance by the vendor. It is a critical problem for
applying mentioned security measures. Furthermore, mapping
in the absence of prior information is essential part of disaster
recovery in critical infrastructure. Importance of this problem
is emphasized in the recent DARPA call for proposals [3].
Therefore, there is a need for a system that provides informa-
tion that would enable the target CI network to be understood
for efficient site-inspection and to ensure that the administrator
exactly understands how their network is configured.
Limitation. An active fingerprinting approach, which provides
accurate results by interrupting the system, is not allowed in
a real environment, because most of the devices used in CI
are either out-dated or have low computational power; thus,
the network could crash as a result of any small interruption.
However, it may not feasible to use a existing passive fin-
gerprinting study of a SCADA network in real environment.
The limitation of existing work is that it relies on a specific
environment, as an example, [4] required a parsing module
of the target SCADA protocol to identify which device is
related to the SCADA part. However, it may require extremely
high cost because each CI typically consists of systems and
products with different specifications deployed by different
vendors. Furthermore, some vendors have designed a propri-
etary SCADA protocol, they decline to provide the customer
with the protocol specifications; instead, they prefer to support
visits by an expert or the use of a remote service not only
to address security problems, but also to prevent technology
leakages. The customized protocol from standard also cause
intefere success of parsing. Therefore, existing work cannot
cover all of real cases for parsing SCADA network trace to
identify their network shapes.
Our Approach. In this work, we propose a novel passive
fingerprinting method to identify the SCADA part in CI
without deep packet inspection (DPI) to avoid dependence on a
specific vendor. Specifically, our goal is to provide information
as to which devices belong to the SCADA part, such as a
field device and the master server by analyzing the network
trace. Our approach is based on the intuition and observation
that although each CI is associated with different vendors
and products, typically SCADA has intrinsic characteristics in
common with others in terms of their purpose and structure,
despite their respective diverse customized environments.
In practice, we collected two CI network traces consisting
of about 2.9TB of data and 0.37TB in a real environment
during normal operation. We represented this network trace
in our segmentation definition. Using these pre-processed
data, we first infer the network port used by the SCADA
protocol (to which we refer as the SCADA port) based on our
ranking function, instead of identifying SCADA protocol type.
This port is identified based on our proposed algorithm with
five features: Periodicity, Communication Durability, Device
Complexity Gap, Service Popularity, and Segment Size. Next,
we inferred SCADA devices in the CI, including field and
master server through common SCADA characteristics such
as the connectivity degree.
The key advantages of our methodology are as follows: (1)
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Our passive fingerprinting approach is able to solve problems
for which the administrator either does not have the exact
information or has to verify their information. It is especially
required when we have to take surveilance for a plenty of our
CI in the field not just a few target CI (2) Our approach does
not leverage DPI, unlike existing work; hence, ours is a generic
technique in terms of SCADA vendor and product.
Contribution. The main contributions of this paper are sum-
marized as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, for the first time, a
passive fingerprinting method is proposed to identify
which devices on the CI network are SCADA devices
without the need for DPI. Our method categorizes
devices into three types as follows: (1) SCADA field
devices, (2) SCADA master server, and (3) non-
SCADA devices known as peripheral devices. We also
showed that we can find HMI in three layer architec-
ture when we have pre-knowledge that it consists of
three layer.
• We present a experiene of handling real SCADA
network trace with our data representation to leverage
intrinsic characteristics of SCADA with verification
and key observation of common knowledge of the
SCADA network with about 2.9TB and 0.37TB of
network traces collected in a real environment.
• Our method distinguishes most SCADA devices from
other devices, except for the secondary HMI, and it
shows that the analysis of a 6% proportion of the
dataset (which required about 2.5 days to collect) can
produce the same result as the entire dataset with
approximately 75 minutes of processing time in our
dataset1.
• We evaluate generality of our method with two differ-
ent types of network traces, SCADA consists of three
layers with single SCADA protocol usage and consists
of two layers with two proprietary SCADA protocol
usage, respectively 1.
Roadmap. We first provide an overview of existing work in
Section 2. Next, we present the preliminaries including the
target environment, threat model, data description, and data
pre-processing in Section 3. In Section 4, we explain our
methodology, and this is followed by the results we obtained
with our method in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss
interesting questions related to our methodology. Finally, we
conclude in Section 7.
II. RELATED WORK
Analysis for Critical Infrastructure Network. A few groups
have reported work in connection with the analysis of control
system networks. For example, a passive analysis tool capable
of providing information about the network architecture has
been described [5]. Other workers developed a tool [6] to
review their security policy to check whether it is configured
as intended based on firewall configuration data. However, the
limitations of the aforementioned work are similar to those
1Our experiment source code will be public via Github for reference without
dataset, once accepted.
mentioned in Section 1 for [4]. Furthermore, these methods
are unable to reveal details of devices identified in the SCADA
network, such as whether they are field devices or master
server.
Passive SCADA Device Fingerprinting. Most SCADAs con-
tain out-dated systems or devices which have been operating
for a few years. These systems are vulnerable to a slight
increase in overhead and have low computational power. These
are common characteristics of the SCADA world, i.e., the long
life cycle of their devices, that complicate the application of
active fingerprinting techniques to real SCADA systems. The
fact that the use of these techniques could possibly compromise
the availability and safety [7] of SCADA components is con-
sidered the reason why the passive approach for fingerprinting
is highlighted in SCADA domains.
The most common passive approach in device fingerprint-
ing is to leverage TCP/IP information [8]. On the other hand,
other studies of fingerprinting for SCADA devices that have
recently been proposed are not based on network tracing, but
rely on port scanning for specific SCADA protocols instead.
A study aiming to identify field devices [9] relied on specific
SCADA protocol functions; for example, the Modbus protocol
provides a function that responds with device information.
The appearance of search engines to search for devices
connected to the Internet [10] has motivated research [11],
[12] using methods other than finding SCADA devices using
port scanning. However, port scanning, categorized as active
fingerprinting, has the limitation in that it can interrupt or halt
devices with low calculation power or those that are out-dated
legacy devices. Therefore, active fingerprinting of SCADA
networks is not allowed in the real environment to prevent loss
of gain and life-threatening disaster. The problems associated
with SCADA device fingerprinting were also addressed by
[13], [14], but they only explain existing work and do not
suggest a specific method. In summary, to the best of our
knowledge, the use of a network trace without DPI to identify
devices in a SCADA network has not been studied to date.
Protocol Reversing The other applicable existing work is
protocol reverse engineering that the process of the inferring
the specification of an unknown network protocol [15]. These
techniques leverage approach for automatically extracting in-
formation of unknown target protocol. Even though they
contribute to analysis of unknown network environment and
helpful to provide major SCADA protocols, it is difficult to
cover for analysis of all our CIs in the field. The main difficulty
of this problem is closed SCADA information that cannot be
provided in public. These techniques based on assumption that
we require enough samples from target environment or classi-
fication from other distinct types of protocols. Understandably,
our CI network information is not public and some major
vendors do not public their SCADA protocol specification and
information. Even though, these techniques help to analysis
several famous SCADA protocol, but this approach is ex-
tremely expensive cost to cover all of environment. As SCADA
market grows, our CI environment becomes heterogeneous
for SCADA device and network protocol. Considering the
possibility that customized protocol from standard also can
make different result from identified signatures, our method
can be applied complementary for analysis of CI that cannot
be covered by protocol reversing efforts.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Target System Environment and Assumption
We should note that, we do not aim to suggest a method
that is completely generic in terms of all types of SCADA
architectures; rather, our method is aimed at a common ar-
chitecture consisting of two layers. Based on our experience,
this work is conducted under the following assumptions and
targets:
• We aim to find two layer SCADA architecture consists
of field devices and their master server. Middle level
layer is omitted in recent SCADA configurations due
to improvement of field devices, unlike traditional
three-layer architecture consists of HMI responsible
for network management by operator, field devices
such as PLC, and middle level layers used to reduce
overhead of HMI and field device. However, we also
provide clue for finding HMI when we already know
that it is configured three-layer architecture.
• We assume that we would be unable to identify the
deployed SCADA protocol type and that the network
port used for their SCADA protocol is not revealed,
since we have no pre-knowledge of the SCADA
protocol or application.
• We assume that we have knowledge for number of de-
ployed SCADA protocol. In practice, at least, SCADA
operator typically knows name of their SCADA ven-
dor or it can be identified by finding contract history.
• We assume that the design of the SCADA protocol is
based on the TCP layer. Although some SCADA pro-
tocols have custom-designed architectures, SCADA
protocols based on TCP are increasingly used for
reasons of compatibility.
B. Data Description and Pre-Processing
Data Description. We collected two network traffic packet
traces in pcap format from the national CI during normal
routine operation. The names and sites of the CI cannot be
revealed for security purposes and identity information is
redacted in this paper. We used a network tapping device with
Wireshark, for collection that would not disturb their normal
routine. In the first dataset, the total size of raw pcap files
is about 2.9TB during a period of a month and a half. The
number of total raw packets is about 4.22 billion and DNP3
[16] is applied for SCADA protocol, which uses 20000 ports
to control field devices. In second dataset, 0.37TB total size of
raw pcap file for 3 days with 0.12 billion and two proprietary
SCADA protocol is deployed by different vendors. We believe
that our target CI belongs to the category of complex CIs and
that this dataset is sufficiently large to reflect the real world
environment of CI, rather than merely a specific aspect.
Data Filtering using TCP Information. We filter two types
of packets. We filtered packets which use several common
network service ports under the assumption that these service
ports will not be changed easily, because of compatibility with
other systems. Second, we filtered packets unrelated to the
type of packets suitable to the purpose of our analysis, such
as ICMP packets that are used to notify network errors. In this
stage, eleven common types of network service packets are
filtered about 7% of the original raw packets (4.22 billion →
4.05 billion packets) in our dataset1.
Communication Segmentation. Our analysis of network traf-
fic is based on communication segments containing groups
of related packets, i.e., our method does not function at the
packet level. There are three reasons why our approach differs
from that used in existing work. First, grouping accompanying
packets used for a certain command or service is an exact
way of measuring periodicity, because a few packets sent
are immediately accompanied by an acknowledgment in a
communication. Second, we observed that SCADA commu-
nication characteristics influence the inter-arrival time analysis
unlike ordinary TCP communication. For an concrete example,
the pattern and length of DNP3 communication is varied
according to the payload [17]. We observe that this is not own
characteristics of DNP3, but common in SCADA protocol.
Third, our dataset is an exception in that it contains data
resulting from constant attempts to establish connections to
specific non-responding systems. In our experience, it usually
happens when a different vendor is involved in changing the
old system without appropriate considering for existing system.
Considering these problems, we represent a network trace
as a communication segment for which the next packet has
not arrived within tcomm threshold period for communication
separation (Figure 1). We heuristically set tcomm as a second
because the periodic monitoring command has a periodicity
that is higher than at least a second so as not to cause severe
overhead to the field devices. For instance, the WirelessHart
sensor from Emerson can configure the sensor device to report
every second as maximum frequent reporting, but in reality,
it is configured to more than that due to battery problems.
In addition, the excessive overhead caused by unnecessary
frequent reporting can increase the maintenance cost. After
processing the data with our communication segmentation
policy, we aggregated data by reducing the data by about 98%
for the analysis of filtered packets (4.05 billion filtered packets
→ 2.06 billion communication segments).
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Fig. 1: Example of communication segment (tcomm=1 second)
Data representation: SCADA Segment 5-tuple. We an-
alyzed the network trace based on our representation that
the SCADA segment 5-tuple (ft) data consist of both the IP
addresses and port numbers of the source and destination ports,
and the segment size (Equation. 1) with their time information.
ft :=< SrcIP, SrcPort,DstIP,DstPort, SegSize > (1)
Note that the segment size is defined as the sum of the size of
packets belonging to the same segment where the unit is a byte.
Our dataset1 contained about 22.5 million different types of
ft with 366 device IP addresses from 2 billion communication
segments. The large number of 5-tuples with the small number
of hosts indicates that there are services based on a dynamic
port policy, which uses a different port for each connection,
and that a range of diverse services are used in our target CI.
IV. METHODOLOGY
A. Overview
Our goal is to create an inside network map of the target CI
by only using the network trace as input. For the sake of our
goal, (1) we first make ranking list for SCADA communication
based on our proposed features (2) we infer the network port
used for the SCADA protocol from the ranking list, then (3) we
infer SCADA devices such as field devices, the master server
from SCADA. If we have one more than deloyed SCADA
protocol, then we remove identified SCADA information from
identified port, then repeat process from inferring SCADA port.
We note that our method require additional information that
the number of deployed SCADA protocol that can be provided
by administrator or survey of contractor.
Algorithm 1: Infer SCADA device list Algorithm
Input : CI network trace dataset
Output: SCADA device lists
1 Pre-processing for network trace;
2 Make SCADA Communication ranking list;
3 for i=0 : num SCADA Protocol do
4 Infer SCADA port from top ranked communication;
5 Find SCADA field device and master server using
inferred SCADA port;
6 Remove inferred SCADA communication from
ranked list;
7 end
B. SCADA Protocol Port Inference
Observation and Intuition. Our approach toward SCADA
protocol port inference is based on our intuitions and obser-
vations from experience. First, the network port used in field
devices for connection with the master server is fixed at the
same SCADA site. Second, SCADA protocol connections have
the tendency to maintain their connection longer than other
forms of communication [14]. Third, we observed that about
99.4% of SCADA communication in our dataset originates
from monitoring field devices, i.e., this communication is
periodically scheduled and automatically operated based on
an event-polling approach. We should note that we observed
that DNP3 communication has obvious periodic characteristics
only when considering each pair consisting of a function code
and object. For a concrete example, in our dataset, most of the
“Read-Response” DNP3 communication was sent by objectA
(77.74% of the total object ratio in “Read” function code)
whose inter-arrival packet distribution has a mean and variance
of 8.75 and 1.48 seconds, respectively. The proportion of each
object varied as a relation of the master server-field device.
This result reflects the complexity of a real environment in
which the CI consists of many field devices configured for
a different role and purpose, and not using identical settings
despite usage of a single SCADA protocol. In summary, even
though SCADA protocols are different and have an unreadable
format, periodicity is an intrinsic characteristic of SCADA
communication, but we need appropriate method to utilize this
characteristic.
SCADA Port Infernce. We first aim to infer the SCADA port
based on a passive approach without DPI by considering this
problem as a ranking problem with proposed function. We
first identify communication corresponding to the relationship
between the master server and field device from ranking
list. Then, we infer the SCADA port as the port used in
the field device in the inferred SCADA communication. Our
ranking function comprises five features: Periodicity (pR),
Communication Durability (dR), Device Complexity Gap (cR),
Service Popularity (uR), and Segment Size (sR).
Specifically, we rank given a dataset FT = [ft1, ..., ftn]
according to our ranking function, where fti is communication
based on our ft representation. Let f denote a ranking function,
which assigns a ranking value fi to each SCADA segment 5-
tuple fti. Let y = [y1, ..., yn] denote a ranking score vector,
where y is scaled to have a value from 0 to 1. This vector y
is computed by solving the following optimization problem:
f∗ = argmax
ft
pR(fti)∗dR(fti)∗cR(fti)∗uR(fti)∗sR(fti)
(2)
Feature1: Periodicity. High periodicity is the most well-
known characteristic of SCADA communication. We measure
the periodicity of the inter-arrival time between segments in a
ft by defining periodicity as pRatio and as follows:
pR(fti) =
meanIATfti
varianceIATfti
(3)
where IAT is the set of iat that sums the inter-arrival time
between communication segments corresponding to fti.
Interestingly, unlike our expectation, SCADA communica-
tion is neither the most periodic communication nor the most
highly ranked in both of our dataset. In our dataset1, there
are 11 types of network services with 345 communications
that are ranked higher than the most highly ranked SCADA
communication with respect to pR with the highest pR being
23,862.69. These services are the heartbeat of network devices
and printers, relationship with the backup and DB server, pe-
ripheral services such as Netbios, and Network Time Protocol
(NTP). They are also configured to carry out scheduled tasks
and their scheduled time for communication varied from 2
to 60 seconds. We should note this order of ranking does
not indicate that SCADA communication is not periodic. It
has sufficient periodicity, but is lower ranked because of a
difference in variance of the order of milliseconds.
Another interesting insight is that the introduction of the
segment size feature to data representation is crucial to capture
the periodicity of SCADA communication. In our dataset, none
of the SCADA communication represented by a 4-tuple (from
which the size feature from our ft definition (Equation. 1)
has been excluded) exceeds a p-ratio value of 1, which is
indicative of un-periodic communication because of diverse
configuration of real environment for each connection. In
our dataset, our data representation captures 557 (0.28% in
SCADA communications) periodic SCADA communications
for pR > 3 and the highest pR is 377.54. Definitely, the main
reason why other cases that unsuccessfully capture periodicity
are limited is that they cannot handle SCADA communication
with the same size and pattern, but a different payload with
periodic time. However, there are some cases with a differ-
ent communication pattern and payload that can be exactly
distinguished by segment size.
Feature2: Communication Durability. It is well-known that
SCADA communication tends to be maintained once estab-
lished, because the purpose and usage of the communication
is fixed when these aspects are configured. We exploited
this characteristic by considering two statistics conjointly:
the observed length of communication and the occurrence of
corresponding communication. We named this feature Com-
munication Durability and defined it as follows:
dR(fti) =
∑
IATfti ∗ log nfti (4)
where nfti is the occurrence of corresponding fti in the total
network trace. The unit of a feature is also important and
we empirically decided to use hours for the observed length
considering the relationship between the log of occurrence
scores.
It should be noted that to decide the filtering thresh-
old heuristically is difficult. For a concrete example, in our
dataset1, although most of the communication segments have
low occurrence values (P (X ≤ 9) = 0.9, P (X ≤ 324) =
0.99) in our dataset, it does not indicate which filtering thresh-
old is desirable, which therefore completely depends on users’
intuition. There are over five thousand types of occurrence
value with the highest value being 72,921,879. Instead of
heuristic threshold, our feature reflect this characteristics to
scroe for ranking.
According to our second feature dR in dataset1, the
highest dR communication is generated by the X11 service
(dR=703.01) and the other highly ranked services are also
related to remote services and network devices. Network
devices do not have to be reset except when they experience
severe problems and do not have to be updated when they
are reset; thus, they have a lengthy relationship based on
communication. The highest SCADA communication is ranked
258 (dR=368.04), proving that SCADA communication is
also maintained for a long period. Even though field devices
maintain their relationship for a long time, they sometimes
require a reset for maintenance purposes or in the case of a
mechanical problem.
Feature3: Device Complexity Gap. In SCADA, there is
a huge difference in terms of diverse network port usage
between field devices and master server. This is because field
devices only provide a simple function that involves periodic
reporting and device status control in an emergency by fixing
the SCADA port, but a master server has to communicate
with many field devices simultaneously and provide support
for other services. Our rough guess is that this difference in
complexity according to the number of distinct network ports
(i.e., the cardinality of the set of network ports) used by the
devices is as follows:
cR(fti) =
|PtSrcIP |
|PtDstIP | , (5)
where Pt is the set of network ports used by SrcIP in the
total network trace.
In our dataset1, all field devices only use a single network
port for SCADA communication. In contrast, a master server
is related to 1,147,082 ft communications (5.10% of the
total number of ft). It means that there is much difference
between the usage of a field device and a master server
in terms of network communication. The highly ranked cR
communication is not SCADA communication, but that of a
peripheral device connected to HMI with the highest cR of
63,350. These peripheral devices are also only configured to
perform a naı¨ve function such as backup or reporting. Although
SCADA communications are not the highest ranked, they are
highly ranked with the highest cR as 32,918 (ranked from
29th to 75th out of a total of 742). We conclude that a small
difference in the order does not have significant meaning,
because it can fluctuate due to dynamic port allocation.
Feature4: Network Service Popularity. The purpose of
this feature is to distinguish the relationship between a
server and simple peripheral device from SCADA com-
munication. The number of 3-tuples, which consist of <
Port, SrcIP,DstIP >, denoted PU(port,SrcIP,DstIP ), rep-
resent the degree of usage of this network port by diverse
devices, and we refer to this property as service popularity
(PU). A field device has an extremely high PU value, but
a master server has a low value. This is because every
field device uses the same SCADA port, but a master server
uses dynamic port allocation. To exploit this idea, we define
Network Service Popularity (uR) as follows:
uR(fti) =
|PU(SrcPort,SrcIP,DstIP )|
|PU(DstPort,SrcIP,DstIP )| (6)
or the inverse of uR when uR is less than 1. According to this
feature, in our dataset1, the most highly ranked communication
is a VPN service used for connecting an HMI to a remote sub-
station and this is followed by SCADA communication.
We note that the occurrence of a port itself cannot be a
useful feature to identify SCADA communication. Because,
in terms of occurrence, communication with lower periodicity
naturally has higher occurrence compared with higher peri-
odicity. In our dataset, communication for checking a device
or service status are sent every a few seconds, but SCADA
communications are scheduled to be sent every minute or
about 8 seconds, typically in our dataset. We therefore do not
consider occurrence of communication as a main feature.
Feature5: Segment Size. Main task of field device in SCADA
is to report their measurement to master server to check
operation status. Naturally, communication for reporting mea-
surement has bigger segment size than others. Depends on
environment, it is configured based on fragmentation packets,
thus analysis based on segment is effective to capture these
communications successfully. Typically, segment used for ser-
vice status check has small segments size less than 100 bytes,
but most reporting communications relatively higher segments
size over 400 bytes. This feature is useful to discriminate from
service status check communications used in master server.
C. SCADA Device Inference
Next, we infer the identity of each system device from the
network traffic based on statistics of the ft and our intuition
with the inferred SCADA port. We infer the identity of devices
from (1) field device, then (2) master server.
Inferring field device. Our idea for the inference of a field
device is based on the intuition that field devices communicate
with a few devices, such as master server, only through the
SCADA port for reporting purposes. To exploit this idea, we
TABLE I: Top-5 ft with respect to proposed ranking function (f ) in dataset1
Rank S-IP S-Port D-IP D-Port SegSize pR dR cR uR sR f
1 FD.31 20000 M 51382 340 0.3801 0.4200 0.5175 0.3636 0.2246 6.7470× 10−3
2 FD.12 20000 M 34362 337 0.3198 0.4582 0.5175 0.3636 0.2226 6.1358× 10−3
3 FD.03 20000 M 55886 332 0.3117 0.4659 0.5175 0.3636 0.2193 5.9924× 10−3
4 FD.03 20000 M 55886 296 0.4613 0.3320 0.5175 0.3636 0.1955 5.6342× 10−3
5 FD.31 20000 M 51382 225 0.4070 0.4200 0.5175 0.3636 0.1486 4.7806× 10−3
TABLE II: Top-5 and 13th ft with respect to proposed ranking function (f ) in dataset2
Rank S-IP S-Port D-IP D-Port SegSize pR dR cR uR sR f
1 FD.A1 PortA M 58292 686 0.5872 0.6573 1.0000 0.2917 0.4531 5.1003× 10−2
2 FD.A1 PortA M 61082 686 0.5872 0.3403 1.0000 0.2917 0.4531 2.6417× 10−2
3 FD.A1 PortA M 58292 288 0.5872 0.6573 1.0000 0.2917 0.1902 2.1412× 10−2
4 FD.A1 PortA M 49179 686 0.6158 0.9999 0.2604 0.2500 0.4531 1.8181× 10−2
5 FD.A4 PortA M 58291 1086 0.4557 0.6502 0.2500 0.2917 0.7173 1.5498× 10−2
13 M 49170 FD.B1 PortB 1514 0.3117 0.7441 0.1847 0.1667 1.0000 0.7140× 10−2
infer field device if device satisfied two conditions, propotion
of SCADA communication and small connectivity degree. We
first investigate the occurrence proportion of network port
usage in each device, before selecting the set of devices that
engage in SCADA communication. Among these devices, we
only consider device as field device candidate, if the proportion
of SCADA communication in a device accounts for more than
half of their total communication. Next, among these field
device candidates, we infer field device when it has smaller
connectivity degree than threshold (we propose threshold as
five from our experience). If it satisfies only first condition, it
can be inferred as master server in our master server inference
stage later.
Our first dataset contains a total of 52 devices that use
SCADA communications, including 1 master server, 49 field
devices, and 2 devices used for reporting. These field devices
are only connected to a master layer. We observe that all 49
field devices only use SCADA communication for reporting
and are only connected to a master server through the 20000
(DNP3) port. On the other hand, a master server has a higher
connectivity degree (64 > 1) and more fts (110,674 > 53) than
a field device. Our idea allows us to use the inferred SCADA
port to easily identify field devices. From our algorithm, we
can exlucde two non-SCADA devices which has SCADA
communication, but introduced for statistics reportinng.
Inferring master server. A CI administrator can deploy
one or more master server for their SCADA for each part
respectively, but we cannot know their exact number. Without
pre-knowledge of this information, we guess the set of master
server when a device satisfies these condition: (1) they are con-
nected to an inferred field device, (2) they engage in SCADA
communication. Hence, all 49 field devices are connected to
the server in dataset1 and 22 field devices from SCADA vendor
A and 4 field devces from SCADA vendor B are connected to
master server in dataset2.
V. RESULTS
We evaluate our methodology by answering the following
questions: (Q1) How well is our method able to identify
SCADA of CI? (Q2) What should be the size of the network
trace to expect a result?
A. Identified SCADA in Critical Infrastructure
Finding SCADA port from SCADA Communication Rank-
ing. As our proposed features, we rank communications to
find SCADA port in both dataset respectively (Table I, II).
Note that we normalized each feature by their maximum
value.We first select the top ranked ft as SCADA commu-
nication representing the relationship between a master server
and a field device through a SCADA protocol. After selecting
the SCADA communication, the port used in a device with a
lower connectivity degree is inferred as the SCADA port. In
our dataset1, 953 of top-1000 communications have network
port 20000 which indicates DNP3 communication and in top-
100 in second dataset, 62 communications are corresponding
to proprietary SCADA protocol A and 14 communications are
SCADA protocol B. We observe that fixed network port usage
on field device side in both dataset. In first dataset, DNP3
network port 20000 is inferred from top ranked communication
(Table I). Same process is conducted in second dataset, but to
find two deployed proprietary SCADA port, we first inferred
first SCADA protocol network port, then find second one after
removing identifieid first SCADA communication (network
port is redacted in second dataset to hide their proprietary
protocol).
Finding SCADA devices using SCADA port. Our method
identifies all SCADA devices as two types, field devices
and the master server, except for the HMIs introduced for
monitoring in first dataset (Figure 2). We provide method
when we have preknowledge that HMI exist (Section VI-A).
Once we identify a SCADA device, then we can try applying
existing active-fingerprinting methods to the other device such
that it will not cause catastrophic disaster even if it were to be
interrupted unexpectedly.
Next, we experiment with our second dataset to prove
generality our our method. Interestingly, our second dataset
deploys the two proprietary SCADA protocols at the same time
for other purpose, thus task is to infer two cluster of SCADA
devices respectively. Note that, existing work cannot be applied
to this dataset because of their proporietary protocols. Our
second dataset is collected from 2-layer SCADA architecture
because it has modern SCADA field device that does not
require middle layer device. Note that, this site has gateway
device to deploy two SCADA protocol simultaneously. We
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Fig. 2: Our target Critial Infrasturcutre network with inferred by our method (FD: field device and M: master server)
regard this device as field device, because it is located in front
of field device and only perform converting communication
to provide compatibility. It identified 22 field devices for first
SCADA group and 4 field devices for second SCADA group,
and one master server
Evalualtion measure: F-score. Finally, we evaluate our
method in terms of F-score with precision and recall. In both
datasets, our method achieve high F-score from our method (F-
scored1 = 0.9709, F-scored2 = 1). In our dataset1, our method
successfully identified all field devices and master server
(precisiond1 = 1), however, our method cannot automatically
identify HMI deployed in dataset1 (recalld1 = 0.9434). On the
other hand, our method completely identified devices related
two deployed SCADA vendors.
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Fig. 3: Precision, reccall, and F-score from both datasets
B. Traffic Volume Decision
The size of the network trace required for our method to be
used successfully is an important question. We investigate the
minimum size of the trace that would provide the same result
as the total trace. In our dataset, about 6% of the network trace
corresponding to amount of 3 days is sufficient to produce
almost the same result as the total dataset with 75 minutes
of processing time. Most of the devices are discovered after
collecting the trace for several minutes only, because, most
of the devices are scheduled for less than a minute. However,
communications for network devices are ranked higher than
SCADA communication by our ranking function, when we
experiment with less than 6% of the network trace. We guess
that the reason is a lower periodicity value even though our
target has higher values with respect to feature3 and feature4.
It is not only caused by reason from margin caused by the
network environment (Section IV-B), but also the limitation of
capturing the exact SCADA communication type without DPI.
We measured the processing time of our method as a
function of the size of the trace. We measured on a system
with an Intel Zeon Processor 2.3 GHz, 128 GB memory, SSD
storage, and implemented by using Java 8 (Figure 4). When
the entire dataset was used for the experiment, it took nearly
11 hours to complete the computation. However, when we
included less than 10% of the dataset, it required less than
2 hours.
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the network trace (%)
VI. DISCUSSION
In this work, we only focused on identifying the field
device and master server in SCADA part in the whole CI
network, but we provide method to identify HMI when we
have pre-knowledge that HMI is deployed in target CI. We also
discuss Moving Target research that can be counter-measure
pontetially.
A. Inferring HMI with preknowledge
Additionaly, if we have pre-knowledge that target SCADA
consists of three layer architecture, then we can infer HMI
from inferred master server. We infer devices to which the
inferred master server sends the largest amount of communica-
tion as HMI. The primary reason for communication between
the master server and HMI is to deliver measurements collected
from field devices. In detail, we define Qtyfti , i.e., the quantity
of communication, as follows:
Qtyfti = nfti ∗ SegSizefti (7)
for a given ft. Because, when we only consider the number
of times communication is sent, it will be dominated by
frequent types of communication such as network status or
service check messages. However, SegSize for measurement
reporting is larger than for these types of communication; thus,
we consider both factors. Then, we infer HMI as destination
device in those relationships with the highest Qtyfti , where
SrcIP is the inferred master server and DstIP is one of the
devices connected with the inferred master server.
In our dataset1 whose SCADA consists of three layer
architecture, we successfully capture the HMI through the
relationship with the highest Qtyfti , where SrcIP is the
inferred master server with 7.55×1013 of Qtyfti . The second
highest device is other peripheral devices for backup with
5.12×1012 and the subsequent ranked devices are field devices
with 1.76×1012, 1.23×1012, and 7.68×1011, respectively. We
should note that a limitation of our method in terms of HMI
inference is that it cannot identify when multiple HMIs are
applied. When there are many field devices that are difficult
to monitor by a single HMI, multiple HMIs can be applied to
monitor these field devices simultaneously.
B. Obfuscation and Moving Target
Because of out-dated and low performance SCADA de-
vices, it is difficult to apply encryption to existing SCADA.
Even though it may have been studied for next generation of
SCADA, introduction of a high-performance device causes a
high expense for device requirements. A method that dynam-
ically changes the properties of a system environment, called
Moving Target Defense (MTD) or Randomization defense, can
be a solution to this problem [18]. In recent times, it has been
highlighted for diverse areas to reduce the attack surface and
was also discussed as an introduction for SCADA [19]. A
sophisticated obfuscation study may become a countermeasure
of our approach. Unfortunately, in our opinion, these defense
techniques may be difficult to apply to a real environment in
the near future.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we present expereince of understanding of
real environemt CI effectively. We propose a novel technique
involving passive fingerprinting of SCADA in a CI network
without the use of DPI, unlike existing work that either
relies on a specific device function or on DPI to perform
fingerprinting. Our method is based on a passive approach
that does not influence the operating system, but performs an
analysis based on a collected network trace by using techniques
such as network tapping or network switch mirroring. Our
work can be used for diverse security applications. Anomaly-
based IDS can use our work to create an initial rule to define
their normal behavior and the identity of the device. Our work
is also expected to be useful for security experts sent to conduct
a manual inspection of CI, or especially a CI administrator
who does not have exact information of the assets under their
management to prepare recovery.
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